We quantitatively analyze the welfare implications of different consumer bankruptcies rules. We examine a dynamic life cycle model where households face idiosyncratic uncertainty. Bankruptcy rules vary along two dimensions: whether discharge of debt is granted to borrowers on demand (fresh start) and the fraction of income garnished from defaulters. We find that the welfare comparison depends critically upon the nature and magnitude of income and expenses uncertainty.
Introduction
Different countries have adopted very different consumer bankruptcy rules. Despite the extensive policy debates on the merits of different bankruptcy laws, there is a lack of models which can quantitatively assess the dynamic effects of the different arrangements. In this paper, we quantitatively analyze the impact of different consumer bankruptcy arrangements. We are particularly interested in two features of consumer bankruptcy: the fresh start provision and garnishment levels. The fresh start provision grants debtors a discharge of all debt in return for current assets. This provision thus exempts future income from the claims of creditors. Garnishment rules refer to the fraction of debt that can be seized after default or during bankruptcy proceedings.
These features are of particular interest as public debate -both in the U.S. and in European countries -have focused on the relative merits and optimal levels of these policies. Recent debate in the United States has focused on the question of whether American bankruptcy rules are too lenient. This debate has been motivated by the fact that in recent years, nearly 1 percent of American households have filled annually for discharge of debt under Chapter 7. Moreover, consumer bankruptcies have increased from little more than 1,000 cases per million adults in 1978 to about 5,000 annual filings in 1996. In absolute numbers this is an increase from less than 250,000 cases in 1978 to about 1,250,000 two decades later
1 . This has led to proposed legislation which would make it more difficult for households to declare bankruptcy.
Public debate in many European countries has moved in the opposite direction. Up until the 1990's consumer bankruptcy laws were non-existent in Germany and most European countries (Alexopoulos and Domowitz (1998) , Niemi-Kiesilainen (1997) ). The inability to declare bankruptcy meant that unlucky debtors could not discharge their debt, remaining liable for past obligations for thirty years to life. More recently, the lifelong liability for debts has been interpreted as a problem in the European debate, and many have suggested that
Europe should adopt many of the elements of American bankruptcy law. This has led to some limited reform, which are reflected in the 1999 amendments to the German insolvency law (similar reforms have occurred in other European countries.) The new law allows for a partial discharge after a 7 year payment plan. However an immediate discharge of debt such as that granted under Chapter 7 in the U.S. is not possible.
A key argument that has been advanced in favor of the "fresh start" provisionsparticularly in the U.S. debate -is the effect of bankruptcy rules on labor supply decisions.
This argument in favour of the "fresh start" doctrine is succinctly summarized in a U.S.
Supreme Court Ruling in 1934:
"One of the primary purposes [...] is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and to permit him to start afresh [...] .
From the viewpoint of the wage earner, there is little difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor [...] The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort [...]"
This idea was cited in the final report of National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997).
In other words, one of the objectives of bankruptcy is to create the proper incentives for consumers to work and accumulate skills who -due to bad shocks -find themselves in a situation where the benefits of working hard are eliminated due to their debt burden.
To address our questions, we examine a dynamic life cycle model. Each period, house-holds decide what fraction of their labor endowment to allocate to working. Households also face an intertemporal problem of how to allocate their income over time.
Household borrow (and save) with perfectly competitive financial intermediaries. These intermediairies offer one period non-contingent loans. Intermediaries are able to observe households current income, current level of borrowing and age when making loans. An equilibrium result is that the intermediaries earn zero expected profit on each loan. We assume that a law of large numbers holds so that intermediaries earn zero profits ex post. A corollary of the zero expected profit condition is that the bond price of debtors varies with their current income, age and level of borrowing.
We make these modeling choice for several (related) reasons. First, we are interested in the role of bankrupcty. This leads us to look at a model where household's ability to self-insure is limited. Second, we wish to evaluate the effects that bankruptcy rules have on labor supply. This leads us to look at a life cycle model where agents may choose to exit the labor force in response to high debt levels. Finally, we wish to have financial institutions which are able to condition loans on observable characteristics of borrowers.
We take as exogenous the bankruptcy rules. These rules specify both the amount that can be garnished from households who default on their debts and whether discharge of debt is granted.
An important question is how to model the cost of defaulting. We incorporate three costs that are frequently mentioned in the literature. One punishment is future exclusion from credit markets. In our model, this corresponds to the inability to borrow and save within the default period. We do not exclude agents from the credit market for any further periods, because, although bankruptcy shows up on a consumer's credit report, many banks specialize in lending to former bankrupts, and therefore the exclusion does not seem to be severe. From a technical point of view this assumption makes our model more tractable, because we do not need to keep track of whether a consumer has declared bankruptcy in the past. The second punishment is a transaction cost on consumption incurred by the bankrupt consumer during the default period. The interpretation of this quasi consumption tax for bankrupts is that the inability to use credit makes consumption more time-consuming and inefficient. For example, it may be harder to rent an apartment with a bad credit record. We assume that this punishment is in effect only for the period in which bankruptcy is declared.
The last punishment is that part of the consumer's income may be seized when bankruptcy is declared. Depending on the bankruptcy rule, this may be only current income, or also future income. We are aware that a chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. precludes any seizure of income, even during the default period. We nevertheless use a garnishment technology in our model as a proxy for several other payments a bankrupt debtor is forced to make.
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In our model, we leave out a fourth punishment mentioned in the literature, the so-called "stigma". We chose not to incorporate such a utility cost of bankruptcy in our model because we cannot calibrate stigma, and it would therefore leave us with a free parameter. Moreover, while the common wisdom seems to be that stigma has fallen over the last few decades, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) find that people who filed for bankruptcy in 1991 had worse financial positions on average than people who filed in 1981. If at all, this would 2 At least three different payments come to mind. First, the "good faith" requirement in U.S. bankruptcy law usually precludes consumers from requesting a discharge of debt immediately after receiving a loan. This means that at least a fraction of one's debt has to be repaid before bankruptcy can be filed. Secondly, assets can be seized during a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Part of the consumption of a 5-year model period could be reinterpreted as durable goods accumulated during that period, which are seized when a bankruptcy is declared. Last, a bankrupt has to pay the court filing fee, legal fees, plus allocate a substantial amount of time to completing paperwork required for filing.
indicate an increase in stigma.
We find that the welfare implications of different bankruptcy rules are sensitive to the type and size of uncertainty incurred. If the only source of uncertainty in the economy are shocks to households labor income (productivity shocks), then a bankruptcy arrangement that severely limits the discharge of debt is better than one where discharge is easy. However, if expense shocks -such as uninsured medical bills, divorce costs or lawsuits -are a significant source of uncertainty, then the insurance value of bankruptcy is increased. For reasonable parameter values, we find that introducing these expense shocks can lead one to conclude that fresh start provisions are welfare improving compared to no-fresh start.
The economic analysis of consumer bankruptcy is a fairly new but rapidly growing field.
At a theoretical level, the basic trade-offs implied by bankruptcy rules in exchange economies with incomplete markets are well understood (see Zame (1993) or Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2000) ).
3 On the one hand, bankruptcy weakens agents' ability to commit to repaying borrowing in the future. This effect is welfare decreasing, as it limits households ability to smooth their consumption across time. Conversely, in incomplete markets environments, bankruptcy increases agents ability to smooth across states as it introduces contingencies into non-contingent debt contracts. Thus, bankruptcy can increase welfare by increasing agents ability to smooth across states. What our approach adds to this literature is a quantitative assessment of these two forces for very specific bankruptcy rules.
Recently, several papers have analyzed the effects of alternative bankruptcy rules. Li (2001) and Repetto (1998) examine two period models where households face uncertainty 3 A somewhat related literature has focused on the implications of economies with limited enforcement, see Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) . about their productivity in the second period of their life.
4 Athreya (2000a) and Athreya (2000b) build on earlier work by Aiyagari (1994) and others to quantitatively analyze the effects of bankruptcy laws in an exchange economy where infinitely lived households face idiosyncratic income uncertainty. Markets are incomplete, as agents can save/borrow only via one period bonds. In the equilibrium, a constant fraction of all agents default. A crucial difference between these papers and our work is the modeling of bond prices. Athreya, Li and Repetto all assume that all agents can borrow at the same interest rate, which implies that intermediaries could make positive profits by deviating from the equilibrium allocation.
To get around this implausible outcome, we allow interest rates to depend on the type of an agent and on the amount borrowed.
The only other paper we know of that also allows interest rates to vary with borrowers' characteristics is Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2001 Westbrook (2000) report that legal fees typically cost between $750 and $1,500. In addition, a debtor filing for bankruptcy has to submit a detailed list of all creditors, amounts owed, source, amount, and frequency of income, all assets and monthly living expenses. A typical chapter 7 bankruptcy takes about 4 months from start to completion.
Chapter 13 permit debtors to keep their assets in exchange for a promise to repay part of their debt over the next 3 to 5 years. The debtors plan must repay unsecured creditors at least as much as they would have received under a Chapter 7 filing. The plan must be confirmed by the bankruptcy judge, but creditors cannot block the plan. In order to qualify for Chapter 13, individuals must have a regular income and their debts must be within prescribed limits (secured debts must be less than $807,000 and unsecured debt must be less than $270,000).
Under both options, an automatic stay is issued upon the debtors filings which stops creditors attempts to collect on unpaid debts either through garnishing of wages or through attaching the debtors property.
B. Who files for bankruptcy?
In brief, a typical debtor is a white lower middle-class woman in her thirties with an extremely high debt-to-income ratio. Sullivan and Warren (1999) report that 40% of all bankruptcies were declared by women, 33% by men, and 28% were joint filings. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) report that about 70% of all bankruptcies were declared by whites, while white people make up only 65% of the American population. On average, bankrupt households are 30-50% poorer than the average household, which means that they are still well above poverty level. However, debt-to-income ratios are well above average. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) report a mean ratio of 2.8 for bankrupts in 1997, compared to an overall ratio of 0.8. 5 The age distribution of bankrupts is best summarized by age-specific filing rates (see table 1 ). The table shows that default rates are highest in the middle age groups.
5 See Kowalewski (2000) for the debt-to-income ratio of the household sector. (2000) C. Why do people file for bankruptcy?
A number of papers have examined the determinants of household bankruptcy decisions. The main cause of bankruptcy is unexpected income and expense shocks. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) analyze a survey of 1991 bankruptcy filings, and find that 67.5% of fillers reported the main cause of their bankruptcy to be the loss of a job.
6 Other important factors included family issues such as divorce (22.1 %), and medical expenses (19.3 %). Repetto (1998) reports data from the 1996 PSID with similar results.
Several other papers stress the importance of medical reasons in filing for bankruptcy. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) analyze a survey of consumer bankruptcies from 1980. They find that medical debt plays a key role in household decisions to file for bankruptcy. Extrapolating the results of their study to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, they claim that medical debt alone can account for roughly 30 percent of U.S. consumer bankruptcies in 1994. Jacoby, Sullivan, and Warren (2000) report results from a study of 1,492 bankruptcies in 1999 and find that 34% of bankrupts owed substantial medical debt, and that 46% report either a medical reason or substantial medical debt.
The Environment
We consider an infinite-horizon, overlapping generations model of households who live for J periods. Each generation is comprised of a continuum of households of measure 1.
All households are ex-ante identical. They maximize their life-time discounted utility from consumption and leisure. Households face idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. Markets are incomplete: the only assets in this economy are person-specific oneperiod non-contingent bonds. A crucial component in our model is the option for households to declare bankruptcy.
A. Consumers
Each household has preferences defined over a consumption good and effort. Preferences can be represented by:
where β i is the discount factor of a household of age i, c j and h j are consumption and effort respectively, at age j, and u(·) is a C 2 , increasing and concave function. The household can choose any work effort in the unit interval. An agent of age j is endowed with e j efficiency units of labor. Her output is determined by productivity, work effort, and the labor endowment. Output of an age j consumer is y j = z j e j h j , where z j is the household's productivity at age j. The productivity parameters z are a random variable with finite support. Productivity is modeled as a Markov chain with an age independent transition matrix Π(z |z). The productivity of an age 0 consumer is drawn from the stationary distribution.
Households face a second type of uncertainty: They may be hit with an idiosyncratic expense shock κ > 0, κ ∈ K, where K is the finite set of all possible expense shocks. An expense shock directly changes the net asset position of a household (see section D). Expense shocks are independently and identically distributed.
B. Financial Markets
The borrowing and lending market is perfectly competitive. Financial intermediaries accept deposits from savers and make loans to borrowers. Loans take the form of one period bond contracts. The face value of these loans is denoted by d. Note that d is the amount that is promised to be repaid next period, not the amount received today. We use the convention that d > 0 denotes borrowing, and d < 0 denotes savings.
These loans are non-contingent, in that the face value of the loan is not contingent on the realization of any variable. However, the bankruptcy/default option introduces a partial contingency, as households have the option of lowering the amount that they must repay by filing for bankruptcy.
When making loans, intermediaries observe the total level of borrowing, the current productivity shock, and the age of the borrower. Thus, the interest rate for borrowers can depend upon age, debt level, and current productivity. Let q b (d, z, j) be the price of a loan issued to a household of age j, with a current productivity shock z, and total debt d.
Intermediaries solve a static problem: They maximize expected profits every period.
In equilibrium, perfect competition assures that intermediaries earn zero expected profits on all loans. This implies that the expected value of repayments must be equal to the cost of the loan to the intermediary. Perfect competition also implies that in equilibrium, cross subsidization of interest rates across different types of borrowers will not occur. Further, this means that the interest rate paid to savers does not depend upon the level of savings and is equal to the risk-free bond price q s , which is given exogenously.
C. Bankruptcy
A household can declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is defined to be a situation where agents seek some pre-specified alleviation of their outstanding debt. A bankruptcy rule is characterized by two elements:
1. A garnishment rule that specifies the amount of a household's assets and earnings that can be seized by creditors.
2. A law of motion for the bankrupt household's debt.
In addition to losing the seized income specified in the bankruptcy rule, bankrupt debtors face two further punishments during the default period. First, bankrupts pay a transaction cost λ, proportional to consumption expenditures during the default period. Secondly, bankrupts cannot save or borrow during the default period.
C.1. Garnishment Rule
All assets of a household can be seized by creditors. We consider linear wage garnishment rules during the default period:
where Γ denotes the total amount garnished and transferred to creditors, y is an earnings exemption that cannot be seized and g ∈ [0, 1] is the marginal rate of garnishment. The garnishment technology is costless.
C.2. Law of Motion for Debt
We consider two alternative laws of motion for the debt of bankrupt households. The first law of motion, which we term the fresh start system, specifies full discharge of all debts.
That is, no seizure of future income is possible. This rule resembles closely U.S. bankruptcy law.
The second system, which we term no-fresh start, is modeled according to European bankruptcy law (up until the 90s). No-fresh start means that the remaining debt (i.e. after seizure of income) is rolled over at a specified rate of interest. We denote this interest rate as r and define the corresponding bond price asq = 1 1+r
. In this regime, there is no discharge of debt. The only alleviation for the bankrupt household comes from the postponement of payments and a potentially lower interest rate.
D. Timing within the Period
The timing within the period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, each household realizes its productivity and expense shocks. If the household receives a positive expense shock κ, then the debt of the household is increased (or savings decreased) by κ.
The household then decides whether it should file for bankruptcy or not and how much time to allocate to working. Work then takes place, and all earnings are deposited directly into a "bank account". If the agent has filed for bankruptcy, the amount that is garnished is deducted, and the consumer is allowed to spend the remainder. Households who declare bankruptcy are unable to save in the period they declared bankruptcy, so they consume all of their earnings net of garnishment and transaction costs. The new debt level depends on the bankruptcy rule. Households who did not declare bankruptcy decide on their net asset holdings for the following period and their current consumption.
Equilibrium A. Consumer Problem: Fresh Start
We define the consumer's problem recursively. At each date, the households chooses current consumption, work effort, to default or not, and next period's debt taking prices (including the bond price schedule) as given. Let I denote the consumer's decision to default.
The value function of an age j consumer with debt d and shock realization (z, κ) is
The consumer's problem for the no-fresh start bankruptcy rule is very similar. The only difference is that the debt level of a bankrupt debtor is not set to zero.
C. Intermediaries
Competitive financial markets imply zero expected profits on each loan. Further, the law of large numbers holds in our model, and hence ex-post realized profits are also exactly equal to zero. Let θ (d , z, j) be the probability that a household of age j with a current productivity shock z and total borrowing d will declare bankruptcy tomorrow. Without garnishment and with full discharge of debt, the zero profit condition is simply
For positive levels of garnishing, this formula needs to be adjusted for how much money lenders can recover from a bankrupt household. Let us first consider the fresh start regime.
The fresh start with wage garnishment version of equation 5 is
We need to make further adjustments for the no-fresh start case. For this case, borrowers may be in default only for a limited number of periods and eventually pay all their debt back.
Even if a household stays in default until the end of its life, creditors can garnish a fraction of the income every period, not just in the original bankruptcy period. This needs to be taken into account for the zero profit condition.
where
The first part in the parenthesis is, as before, the probability of fully repaying one's debt. Secondly, in the case of bankruptcy, there will be an expected partial repayment of debt by way of garnishment during the default period. The last term is the expected value of the remaining debt.
D. Equilibrium
Definition 1 
E. Existence
The proof of existence for the fresh start environment is straightforward. Essentially, all that one has to prove is that, given any q s , there exists a schedule of bond prices q b such that intermediaries earn zero profits and the consumers problem is well defined. A formal proof of existence is provided in the appendix.
F. Computation
The solution is computed numerically. The algorithm solves the problem backwards by solving for the agents decisions in their last period of life as a function of the state variables.
We compute the optimal decisions using a grid for the possible asset holdings.
Calibration
In this section, we present a preliminary calibration exercise for the United States.
The Appendix contains a more detailed description of the calibration and parameters.
We assume that agents live 10 periods 7 and that life begins at age 20. Each period of life is 5 years in length. The utility function is:
where a denotes the autonomous consumption that agents receive regardless of their effort decisions, and χ is the disutility of working.
We calibrate the preference parameters as follows. The disutility of working, χ is chosen so that a household with average productivity and labor endowment would choose to allocate 40 percent of its time to working. The autonomous consumption term is set equal to 5 percent of the earnings of an average household. This value is intended to approximate the value of government transfers to households. The benchmark preference parameters are χ = 1.3 and a = 0.01.
The β are calibrated to match the age dependent probabilities of dying and family 7 The number of periods was chosen due to computational limitations. We are currently exploring alternative computational methods which would allow us to increase the number of periods.
size reported by the Bureau of the Census. We measure household size in adult equivalents.
In our measure of adult equivalents, we assume that persons under the age of 18 have weight 0.5. The appendix contains a more detailed discussion of the calibration of the β.
The transition matrix Π(z |z) is estimated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We assume that there are five productivity shocks. We calibrate the relative productivities so as to match mean labor earnings by earnings quintiles. Normalizing the earnings of the lowest quintile, we have the following ratio of relative productivities: The transition matrix is also estimated using the PSID. It is computed as the probability of moving between earnings quintiles over a five year period.
9 The transition matrix is reported in the appendix.
The life cycle labor endowment is calibrated to match the life cycle earning profile reported by Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997) using data on households earnings reported in the 1992 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Normalizing the income of households 25 and under to 1, the relative endowment of efficiency units of labor is: We are aware that we this measure does not take into account differences in hours worked. We intend to more carefully calibrate these parameter in the near future.
9 We would like to have age dependent transition probabilities. We cannot estimate these probabilities using the PSID due to the small sample size (with ten age groups and 5 income groups we have 50 cellsimplies that we have 25*9 = 225 transition probabilities to estimate).
rate is one which a risk free household could borrow at. We take the prime lending rate of banks as a proxy for this interest rate. This suggests that the annual interest rate should be in the range of 2% to 4%. We report the results for several different interest rats in this interval.
A. Expense Uncertainty
To calibrate the expense shock, we look at data on expenses that are both unexpected and beyond the direct control of a household. We consider three different sources of shocks: medical bills, divorce and unplanned pregnancy.
10 All three of these shocks are frequently cited by bankrupts as the proximate cause of their bankruptcy.
In our model, expense shocks take one of three positive possible values: κ ∈ {κ 1 , κ 2 , 0}.
We also need to pin down the associated probabilities: π 1 , π 2 , and (1 − π 1 − π 2 ). Our calibration strategy is to collapse the data on the three different shocks into three similar mass points, and then to add the three shocks together.
In calibrating the medical expense shock, we utilize data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). MEPS reports detailed data on medical expenses in 1996 and 1997 for a random sample of 22,000 persons (8,073 families). For each person in the sample, total medical charges, expenditures, out of pockets payments and monthly insurance status are reported.
The measurement of the size of the medical shock is not clear-cut. The reason is that out of pocket expenditures reported in MEPS do not include unpaid debts and thus is an underestimate of the medical bills incurred by households. 11 Total medical charges has the opposite problem, as it includes both charity care and does not account for discounts routinely given by hospitals on medical bills.
We impute the quantity of unpaid medical bills as follows. We first compute an estimate of bad debt. The American Hospital Association (AHA) reports that U.S. hospital bad debt in 1996 was 16.4 billion. This is approximately 4.1 percent of total hospital charges in 1996. Assuming that bad debt for the entire medical sector is equal to 4.1 percent, and using the total medical charges reported in MEPS (787.9 billion), the implied bad debt is $32.3 billion. To get household level shocks, we need to allocate this figure to individuals.
We do this by allocating the bad debt to indivduals who were not insured for at least one month in 1996.
Formally, we compute the medical shock of individual i for 1996 and 1997 as the sum of out-of-pocket expenses (oop) plus a fraction a of the difference between the total charges (char) less total expenditures (exp) for each year. The shock of individual i is:
where I96 i = 0 if i was insured all of 1996, and 1 otherwise, and I97 i = 0 if i was insured all of 1997, 1 otherwise. To compute the shock of a family, we simply add up shock i for all family members. The parameter a = 0.545 is chosen so that the implied bad debt is $32.3 billion.
We impute the 5 year medical shock by assuming that medical shocks are independent across two year periods. 12 The implied medical shock for a 5 year period is reported in Table III . The probability of the divorce shock is easy to compute. In 1996, there were 99,627,000
households and 1,159,000 divorces (U.S. Census Bureau (2000)). Thus, the annual divorce probability is 1.15 percent. We assume that a household can receive at most one divorce in each five year period. This implies that the probability of a divorce shock is 5.6 percent.
We look at two different costs of divorce. The first is legal fees. As any divorce lawyer will tell you, the cost of a divorce can vary from less than a thousand dollars to hundreds of thousands. We choose a figure of $5,000, which is if anything a lower bound on the average legal costs of divorce. The second cost we consider is the loss of economies of scale associated with the breakup of a household. On average, one child is involved in a divorce. Thus, the average divorce means a split of a 3-person family into a 1-person family and a 2-person family. We use equivalence scales (ES) reported in the literature to compute the decrease in effective income. 13 Using this equivalence scale, for the average divorce, effective income drops by 28%. Multiplying this by an average household income of $41,255, this implies an annual decline of $11,450. We assume that shocks persist for 4 years. This yields a value for the total divorce shock of $50,800.
12 Since we do not account for persistence beyond two years, the figures we use are a lower bound on the magnitude of the medical expense shocks. 13 We use the average of a number of studies reported in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2000). The final shock is the cost of an unwanted child. In the U.S., 30% of all births are unintended (U.S. Vital Statistics). However, only 9.1% are unwanted. In 1996, there were 3,891,000 births. Multiplying this by the fraction of unwanted children yields 354,081 unwanted births. Dividing this by 99,627,000 households implies an annual child shock probability of 0.00355. We assume that this shock is independent over time, which implies that the probability of having at least 1 unwanted child in 5 years is 0.0176.
The Department of Agriculture (1996 annual report) reports the average annual expenditures for a child less than 2 years old. We use $ 8,000 as the annual child cost. Assuming that these costs are incurred for 5 years, we have a shock of $40,000. Table VI summarizes our calibration of the three expense shocks. We combine the divorce shock, the child shock and the small medical shock into one shock by taking the probability weighted average of the $40, 000 and $50, 800 shocks. The shocks we calibrate to are:
The actual values we use are the above values relative to average household disposable income. 
B. Bankruptcy Rules
An important question is how to calibrate the parameter associated with bankruptcy:
λ, g and y. In this version of the paper, we set λ = 0.1. An important issue in calibrating garnishment levels is that households typically have to wait some time before defaulting.
Bankruptcy codes contain general provisions that borrowers must act in "good faith", so that borrowing and immediately filing for bankruptcy runs some risk of being denied. In the current version of the model, the parameter g is intended to capture this fact by requiring that agents must repay at least some fraction of their debt. This fact may be important, as unsecured debt typically has a much shorter term to maturity than secured debt. We experiment with different values for g. We set the exemption level,ȳ, equal to 15% of mean income.
Results
This section is organized as follows. The first part describes a benchmark case in detail, compares it to the data, and analyzes the basic forces at work in our model. The second part consists of several policy experiments that show how the welfare conclusions depend on the garnishment technology, the interest rate, the expense shocks, and the level of government transfers. The last section discusses the characteristics of bankrupts in our experiments.
For each experiment, we report five key statistics: the average borrowing interest rate, debt relative to GDP, GDP, welfare, and the fraction of households which declare bankruptcy.
The average borrowing interest rate is the debt-weighted average interest rate. Our measure of welfare is the ex ante expected utility of an agent about to be born into our economy. All numbers are reported for a model period corresponding to five years.
Before looking at the results, we want to set out the basic trade-off between FS and NFS bankruptcy rules. Each affects the ability of households to smooth consumption over periods and across states. Borrowing as a means to smooth intertemporally is needed in this economy because of the hump-shaped life-cyle earnings profile, while the lack of insurance markets creates a role for bankruptcy as a way to smooth across states. Each bankruptcy regime facilitates one type of smoothing and hurts the other. Under FS, it is relatively easy to declare bankruptcy and discharge one's debt, which facilitates smoothing across states.
However, this makes intertemporal smoothing difficult for two related reasons. First, the ease of bankruptcy effectively constrains borrowing for most agents. Young agents, who would like to borrow and repay when they are older and have a higher labor endowment, do not receive much credit from the intermediaries, since they cannot commit to paying it back.
Second, (young) agents face high interest rates on their borrowing, making borrowing very costly, and creating another obstacle to consumption smoothing across time. Under NFS, on the other hand, the cost of declaring bankruptcy is much higher, as discharge of debt is not granted. Thus, bankrupcty merely lets a household spread the effects of a bad shock across time. Hence, bankruptcy under NFS is not very helpful in terms of smoothing consumption across states. On the other hand, the low default rate lowers the interest rate and makes households less borrowing constrained, which makes it easier and less costly to smooth across time. The welfare comparison between FS and NFS therefore depends on which type of smoothing is more important. This depends on several factors, including the magnitude of the expense shocks, the risk-free interest rate, and government transfers. After explaining the basic trade-off for the benchmark model in the next section, we will discuss how each of the four policy experiments affects the trade-off.
A. Benchmark Experiment
The benchmark parameters are reported in Table VII . There are a few parameters which deserve comment. The risk free interest rate (r s ) corresponds to an annual interest rate of 2.3 %, which is at the lower end of the relevant range, as discussed in the calibration section. The roll-over interest rate for the no Fresh Start case is twice the riskless rate.
The benchmark bankruptcy parameters correspond to an exemption level of 15% of average income, a garnishment of 25% of income above the exemption, and a transaction cost of 10% of consumption during the default period. The first row of There were 673,123 non-business Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in 1996, which corresponds to 0.68% of all households. This number is an overestimate of the number of consumer bankruptcies, as it includes filings caused by the failure of unincorporated small businesses.
Our benchmark model predicts 1.67% defaults over a five year period, which amounts to an annual default rate of 0.33%. The benchmark model is thus able to account for half of the observed bankruptcies. As we discuss below, the default rate is sensitive to the amount of uncertainty in the economy. Our calibration of the expense shocks was rather conservative, and hence it is likely that the probability and amount of shocks in the real world is higher than in our calibration. This could explain the gap between the observed default rate and the default rate predicted by the model. In the benchmark economy, welfare is higher in the NFS world than under the FS system. This is driven by the fact that in the benchmark economy, the benefits from being able to smooth across time outweigh the benefits from smoothing across states. With garnishment of only 25%, the punishment for defaults is low under FS, which leads to relatively high default rates, which in turn induces an average borrowing interest rate that is more than twice the risk-free rate. Note that this is the average interest rate among households that actually do borrow. Households face a steep interest rate schedule, and the endogenous debt constraints are stringent. This causes intertemporal borrowing to be low, and is reflected in the low debt/GDP ratio and thereby makes people worse off. Under NFS, on the other hand, the default rate is 0.11%, which is less than a tenth of the FS default rate.
This low default rate, together with the fact that creditors can garnish wages of bankrupts for more than one period, means that in effect almost all debt is recovered, leading to an average interest rate that is only slightly higher than the risk-free rate. The low interest rate facilitates smoothing over time. This effect is reflected in a debt/gdp ratio of 4.0%, which is about four times the FS ratio.
A key argument that has been advanced in favor of the "Fresh Start" provisions, is the effect that bankruptcy rules have on labor supply decisions. According to this argument, the life-long liability of debt may cause debtors to "give up" and not work at all for the rest of their lives, while the discharge of debt allows the debtor to start afresh, and hence provides the right work incentives. We do not find this effect in our model. If at all, the model predicts the opposite effect on effort. In the benchmark case, output is about 0.2% higher under NFS compared to FS. This means that instead of giving up, when hit by a bad shock, households work even harder to get out of bankruptcy. This effect is even stronger when the interest rate is high (experiment 3), where output is almost 1 percent higher under NFS compared to FS. The only cases in which indebtedness may become oppressive and lead households to work less when in default is when garnishment levels are extremely high.
B. Change in Garnishment
The first experiment performed is an increase in the garnishment rate from 25% to 50%. This is an increase in the punishment for declaring bankruptcy, and hence increases welfare under FS. Since bankruptcy is now more costly, default rates drop by about 40 percent.
This in turn lowers the average risky interest rate, making borrowing more affordable, and hence increasing the debt/GDP ratio by more than 60%. In the NFS world, default rates are already so low that a further decrease actually decreases welfare. The reason is that bankruptcy functions as an insurance arrangement for people with really bad luck. If the punishment for declaring bankruptcy is so high that bankruptcy rates are close to zero, then there is in effect no insurance for bad shocks. These opposing forces cause the welfare gap between FS and NFS to shrink considerably.
C. The Role of the Interest Rate
The second experiment shows that the welfare comparison is sensitive to the risk-free rate. In this experiment, we nearly double the risk-free interest used in the benchmark model, from an annual rate of 2.3% to 4%. For consistency, we also increase the roll-over rate to 6.3%. Under the higher interest rate, the welfare comparison reverses as aggregate welfare is higher under FS. The reason for this reversal is related to the interplay between the benefits from smoothing across time and states. A high interest rate reduces the benefits from young agents borrowing to smooth consumption intertemporally. This reduces the costs to young households under FS of being able to borrow very little. Similarly, it reduces the benefits of the superior intertemporal smoothing provided by NFS. The default rates under NFS are 0.03%, meaning that which means that very few agents choose to employ bankruptcy to mitigate the effects of adverse shocks.
This experiment also results in higher average work effort and output under NFS. This is caused by households working hard to avoid bankruptcy after receiving bad shocks.
D. The Role of Expense Shocks
In this experiment, we double the magnitude of both expense shocks. This experiment shows that with more uncertainty, FS dominates NFS in welfare terms. The intuition here is again related to the insurance role of bankruptcy. As the degree of uncertainty about future incomes and expense shocks increases, so too does the value of insurance. Under NFS, bankruptcy is so costly that only 0.45% use default to alleviate a bad shock, compared to more than 2% in the FS world. This shows that relatively more FS household are able to use bankruptcy as insurance compared to NFS. Of course, as before, higher default rates cause higher interest rates, as can be seen from an average rate of 28% over 5 years under FS, compared to only 13% under NFS. This explains why the debt/GDP ratio under NFS is more than double the FS ratio. While this works in favor of the NFS regime, the extra benefit from being able to borrow more when young is not enough to outweigh the utility loss from the effective lack of insurance against expense shocks.
This experiment is of interest for two reasons. First, both the debt over GDP ratio and default rates are closer to the U.S. data than in the benchmark case. As argued before, we also suspect that our calibration underestimates the degree of expense uncertainty.
To analyze the role of expense shocks even further, we also ran experiments for the same economy without any expense shocks (not reported here). The findings are that without expense uncertainty, the welfare difference between NFS and FS is even more in favor of NFS compared to the benchmark model. This is consistent with the literature. Athreya (2000b) finds that the current U.S. bankruptcy law is too lenient and that toughening it would increase welfare. However, as we have argued in section A, there is a high amount of expense uncertainty in the U.S. This has been largely ignored in the literature. Our experiment above
shows that if the expense uncertainty is large enough, then the more lenient FS bankruptcy code is better than a stricter bankruptcy code.
E. Government Transfers
The benchmark model assumes that autonomous consumption is 5% of average income, meaning that a household who does not work can still consume this amount. To test the sensitivity to this parameter, we increase this amount to 30% of average income. This experiment shows that high government transfers can reverse the welfare results compared to the benchmark model. One important implication of high transfers is that the marginal utility from consumption goes down, this is particularly important for young households who do not have much labor earnings. Hence, smoothing across time becomes much less important. This means that although the FS interest rate is extremely high, this does not hurt households as much relative to the benchmark. High transfers also mean that default is not very costly, because the transfer is exempt from garnishment. This is reflected in extremely high default rates, 3.68% and 7.09% for FS and NFS respectively. However, default is much more beneficial under FS because of the discharge of all debt. Under NFS a bankrupts unpaid debt is rolled over to the next period, and households are forced to pay it back eventually.
Therefore, while a high number of NFS housholds make use of bankruptcy, it provides only very partial insurance, insofar as it only lets the household pay back the expense shock over time, but does not forgive it.
F. Bankrupts in the Model: Who Files and Why?
The model offers a rich set of predictions on the characteristics of bankrupts. These predictions are of interest as comparing them to the data (discussed in Section 2) provides a check on the performance of our model.
The overall impression of bankrupts is similar to the picture painted by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) . The model predicts a steep demographic profile. Table   IX reports the demographic profile of bankrupts for the benchmark parameters. As can be seen, the model predicts a steeper profile of defaults than that observed in the data. This is driven by the shape of the life cycle earnings profile. In the model, virtually all borrowing is motivated by households desire to smooth intertemporally. This leads to a clustering of borrowing by young agents, and as a result defaults are also clustered around this time. This prediction is qualitatively consistent with the data. We find that most bankrupts are in shocks in the model. In the FS experiments, we find that roughly two-thirds of bankrupts in the model received an expense shock in the period they filed for bankruptcy. This figure is somewhat higher that that reported in the empirical literature. However, most household who receive an expense shock do not declare bankruptcy: only one in four of the households who were hit by the large expense shock defaulted, and roughly one in seven of households hit by the small expense shock declared bankruptcy. This suggests that our expense shocks are not so large that they "force" households into bankruptcy as most households choose to pay the expense shock rather than default.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a formal model of consumer bankruptcy with a competitive lending market, and use it to quantitatively analyze different consumer bankruptcy rules.
Our model generates interest rates that differ across types of consumers and also depend on the consumer's total debt.
Should we take this model seriously? How reasonable are our assumptions? One assumption that deserves some discussion is the observability of income and total debt and whether banks indeed condition loan contracts on income and debt level. Many creditors employ scoring models as part of their evaluation of consumer debt (Engen (2001) ). These scoring models employ data on a household's current debt level, the number of recent applications for credit from other sources and the amount that the household wishes to loan, when deciding upon the interest rate to charge and whether to make the loan. In addition, applicants are required to provide information about their employment and income. While some applicants provide inaccurate information, it is worth noting that bankruptcy law does not allow for the discharge of loans obtained via fraudulent means.
One aspect of bankruptcy that is completely left out in our study is the role of durable assets which may be seized by creditors. However, a study cited by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997, p. 136) reported that 95 percent of Chapter 7 cases yielded no assets which could be liquidated to repay creditors.
14 Moreover, most of the 5 percent of cases that did have assets which could be liquidated were business cases. These business cases yielded 80 percent of the total assets seized under chapter 7. This suggests that abstracting from seizure of durable goods may not be prominent for our results.
The main point of this paper is that welfare evaluations of different bankruptcy rules are sensitive to the degree and type of uncertainty. We compare Fresh Start with No Fresh
Start bankruptcy laws, and analyze each for different garnishment technologies. We find that the welfare comparison depends crucially on the degree of uncertainty that households face.
When the degree of income and expense uncertainty is on the low end of our estimates for the U.S., we find that a No Fresh Start bankruptcy is superior to a Fresh Start system. However, when we repeat the experiments with a higher value of expense uncertainty, we find that the Fresh Start system dominates No Fresh Start. We also find that the welfare comparisons depends upon other factors, such as the level of garnishment, the magnitude of government 14 The sample size was 1.2 million cases.
transfers and the risk free interest rate.
These results have important implications for policy evaluation. There has been considerable public debate in the U.S. with regards to tightening the existing bankruptcy legislation. Most of the literature which has evaluated the welfare implications of these reforms has ignored the role of expense uncertainty. Our findings suggest that this omission is significant.
In future work, we hope to refine our model so that we can conduct more detailed analysis of proposed changes to U.S. bankruptcy legislation, so that we quantify the importance of this omission.
Our results also suggest a promising direction for future research: to compare the relationship between bankruptcy rules and uncertainty across countries. For example, consider the comparison between Germany and the U.S. Germany is a country with a well-developed social security system, and mandatory health insurance. As many studies show, income inequality in Germany is much lower than in the U.S. In the U.S., on the other hand, income inequality is high and many people do not have health insurance. Our results suggest that a no fresh start bankruptcy system would be preferred (on a welfare basis) in Germany, whereas a country like the U.S. with higher uncertainty might prefer a system that allows for a fresh start. In practice, this is what we observe. Germany has a bankruptcy law with hardly any Fresh Start elements, while the U.S. system incorporates Fresh Start provisions. We are currently working on collecting more data to document the extent of differences in income and expense uncertainty in Germany and the United States, which we hope to incorporate in future works.
A2. Existence Proof
Since the risk-free interest rate q s is exogenous, and we allow intermediaries to borrow and lend at this rate from abroad, markets do not need to clear domestically. Hence, the existence proof for this economy reduces to showing that bond prices are well-defined and that the consumer's problem has a solution. The proof is by backward induction and involves the following steps. Last Generation.
Define the value of repaying:
and non-repayment:
Note that this is constant in d.
Both maximization problems are well-defined (maximization of continuous function over a compact set).
15 Define the value function as
Note that it is always finite since the value of non-repayment is finite.
Since constraint correspondence is continuous, by the (standard) maximum theorem Upper Semi-Continuity of Pricing.
The price is defined as
where expectation is conditional on declaring bankruptcy and the current state z.
We follow the convention that a household who is indifferent between repaying and not repaying its debt, does not declare bankruptcy. Combined with the single crossing property of V R and V B , that implies that (1 − θ j (d , z) ) is an u.s.c. decreasing step function of d .
Observing that E is decreasing. This shows that a solution exists and hence completes the proof.
A3. Unsecured Consumer Debt
The total amount of consumer credit outstanding is reported by the Federal Reserve.
Maki (2000) reports that total consumer credit relative to disposable personal income has remained roughly constant since 1970, remaining between 16 and 21 percent.
In this paper, we are interested in the unsecured portion of consumer credit. The
Federal reserve reports consumer credit in two categories: revolving and non-revolving credit.
The non-revolving portion includes loans for automobiles, mobile homes, education, boats, trailers and vacations. This suggests that most of the loans in this category are either secured by durable goods (such as automobiles or boats) or are used to finance human capital accumulation (education). In either case, these are loans that do not correspond to what we look at in our model. This leads us to use revolving consumer credit as a measure of unsecured consumer debt. Revolving credit is debt which has flexible repayment schedules, and includes credit cards and overdraft plans on checking accounts. In 1996, revolving credit was approximately 8.8 percent of personal disposable income. However, this number is likely to overestimate total consumer debt. The reason is that many small business owners finance their business operations via personal credit. As a result, revolving consumer credit may contain a significant 16 See Claude Berge, Topological Spaces, Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1963. fraction of business loans.
An interesting feature of the data is that there has been a rapid increase in revolving credit over the past 20 years. Maki (2000) reports that revolving credit has increased from less than 2 percent of personal disposable income in 1970 to nearly 9 percent in the late 1990s. Over the same time period, non-revolving debt has declined from roughly 18 percent of disposable personal income to roughly 12 percent. Thus, much of the increase in revolving credit has involved the substitution of one type of debt for another.
Consumer Bankruptcies
In 1996, 989172 non-business bankruptcy petitions were filled. These petitions were filled under chapter 7 and chapter 13. Subtracting the chapter 13 bankruptcy filings, we have a total of 673148 consumer bankruptcy filings. The total number of U.S. households in 1996 was 98.7 million. This gives a bankruptcy filing rate of approximately 0.68 percent.
It is worth noting that the total number of chapter 7 petitions in 1996 was 712,129.
However, this total includes some business bankruptcies. Our calculations excludes these filings.
